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Weissman: Masters of the Universe: Deconstruction and the Yuppies

MASTERS OF THE UNIVERSE
Deconstruction and the Yuppies
FOR ARTHUR HOFFMAN AND WALTER SUTION

JUDITH WEISSMAN

lI

~superhuman

r:E BIG GAME THESE DAYS among the five-year-old set is the drama played out by a group

characters called Masters of the Universe. The battle between He-Man and Geldor
is positively Manichaean in its absoluteness and intensity. No less absolute and intense is the battle engaging the thirty-five-year-old set in English departments at American and British universities: the battle between he-men Althusser, Derrida, and Lacan, and the pathetic, outmoded, retrograde, humanist wimp
geldings who have exerted their cultural imperialism over literary studies for the last couple of thousand
years. The reign of these villains is coming to an end, however-so we are told. Only a few last academic
Armageddons remain to be fought, and then the veils of empiricist ideology will fall away, laying bare the
literary universe in its true horror-a system of gaps and lacunae, linguistic differences, and "unconsciouses"
of texts that reveal the true history of the capitalist mode of production. Fasten your seat belts, everyone;
we are in for quite a landing.
The two games-Masters of the Universe and what is commonly called deconstruction-are deeply similar;
they both foster an illusion of limitless power in the players. (Since all activity, in some circles, is merely
an arrangement of linguistic differences, it is no denigration to call deconstruction a game.) This illusion
doesn't worry me in relation to Masters of the Universe; its emotional appeal is clearly connected with
the stories of monsters and maidens, giants and plucky young men with which children have always satisfied their wish to be bigger and stronger than their parents. (I do hope that my five-year-old friends do
not know what "geldor" means, however-all they need is more castration anxiety.)
Deconstruction is another story. As a retrograde and outmoded member of a large and embattled English department, I would like to ask three basic questions about deconstruction : What are its internal
flaws? How is it a manifestation of the cultural and political condition of the present? And finally, can
a persuasive argument be made against it in terms that go beyond academic dispute? There is no shortage
of attacks on the internal logic of deconstruction in its many forms. Frederick Crews discusses both the
pretension and the illogic of the new theories in his review, "The House of Grand Theory."' Several essays
in Rheturic and Fonn: DeconstructWn at Yale also treat deconstruction less than kindly, Barbara Johnson going after sexism in "Gender Theory and the Yale School;' and Barbara Foley, as a straightforward Leninist,
attacking Derrida's politics of ineffectuality? George Watson and David Hirsch challenge deconstruction's
theories of language and alleged revolutionary newness in the Summer 1985 issue of the Sewanee Review,'
and John Searle, in the New York Review of Books, does a superb job of pointing out the gross historical
fulsehoods on which Derrida's theories are based.4 Above all, E. P. Thompson takes on Althusserian "Marx-
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ism" in The Puverty of Theory, 5 a book too little known in English departments. I cannot add a lot here;
therefore I will concentrate on the cultural meaning of this latest form of literary criticism.
In order to avoid duplicating the works I have mentioned, and to limit a potentially endless discussion,
I shall refer most frequently to what has become a virtual handbook in many English departments, Catherine Belsey's Critical Practice.6 It is not the best or the brightest of the new theoretical books, but it has
been widely accepted and clearly presents some of the basic tenets of the New Program. The New Program
is nothing less than a new way of reading providing an escape from the "authoritarianism" and "cultural
imperialism" of what has been received as literature, and enabling the properly trained, truly rigorous reader
to "deconstruct" texts in order to discover what Belsey calls the "real knowledge of history;' the history
of ideologies which are necessitated by enslaving modes of production? Everything that readers (and listeners,
presumably, in nonliterate cultures) have thought they were doing is wrong. Dupes, fools, fulling for the
tricks and traps of ideology dished up as poetry and fiction, they have idiotically believed that they were
selves, characters, hearing about other characters. They have remained in their mental chains for aeons.
But the time for liberation is at hand.

\'XI..
~

HPJ BELSEY AND COMPANY wn,;dcc thcit twen6<eh-ccntury btginn;ng ;, tht lin-

guistic work of Saussure. To hear Belsey tell it, he is a reincarnated Bishop Berkeley, asserting
the absolute primacy of mind over matter-asserting, in fact, the nonexistence of matter except as a product of mind:
The wwst revolutionary element in Saussure's position was his insistence that language is not a nomenclatu~,
a way of naming things which alrnuiy exist, but a system ofdifferences with no positive terms. He argued that
far from providing a set of /ahels for entities which exist independently in the world, language precedes the existence of independent entities, making the world intelligible by diffirentiating between concepts.8
What Saussure actually says, however, is something quite different .
Psycho/qJically our thought-apartfrom its expression in wrmis- is only a shapeless and indistinct mass. Philosophers
and linguists have always agreed in recognizing that without the help of signs we would be unable to make
a clear-cut, consistent distinction between two ideas. Without language, thought is a vague, uncharted nebula.
Th~ a~ no pre-existing ideas, and nothing is distinct before the appearance of language. 9
It is not the same to say that language precedes ideas, and that language precedes independent entities.
The leap from linguistics to ontology, from a theory of language to a theory of being, the leap on which
the prevailing deconstructionist theories are based, is a fanciful addition to Saussure. The removal of this
prop alone leaves the system mighty shaky.
Are Ms. Belsey and friends actually such natural-born idealists that they genuinely believe that nothing
exists except as it is differentiated by language? Does not one of them own a dog whose preferences, for
people, places, foods-preferences that are certainly not the products of linguistically created differencesmight give him or her pause about this "idea"? Saussure does not say what Belsey says he does, and even
if he did, why hasn't the evidence easily available to her and to all other living beings driven her to second
thoughts?
One possible answer is that all commonsense evidence is disdained by Belsey and other deconstructionists; this disdain is traceable to a much newer demigod, Louis Althusser. From him comes the idea
that the goal of true thought is the destruction of empiricism, a.k.a. science, a.k.a. common sense, a.k.a.
idealism, a.k.a. ideology. As Belsey puts it,
Common sense proposes a humanism based on an empiricist:-ideRlist interpmation of the world. In other
wtmis, common sense urges that «man'' is the origin and source of meaning, ofaction, and ofhistory (humanism) . Our concepts and our knowledge are held to be the products of experience (empiricism), and this experience is pm:eded and interpreted by the mind, reason or thought, the property ofa transcendent human natu~
whose essence is the attribute of em;h individual (idealism). 10
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This is dubious enough. Althusser is even more obscure:
I must nevertheless compare the conceptWn which underlies the prescribed religWus reading with another
just as liPely conceptWnJ and onc which to all appearances is its secular transcriptWnJ the empiricist
conceptWn of knowledge. I use this term in its widest sense) since it can embrace a rationalist empiricism as well as a sensualist empiricism) and it is even found at work in Hegelian thought itself, which)
in principle) and with HegePs own approval) can be regarded in this respect as the reconciliatWn ofreligWn and its secular a truth .JJn
This is fancy footwork, indeed, to make empiricist Galileo and his religious persecutors coconspirators in
the perpetration of the imprisoning ideologies of empiricism and religion .
The deconstructionist attack on empiricism-the scientific method-is based on a misunderstanding of
science. Common sense tells us that the earth is flat; religion tells us that it is the book of God; science
is radically different from both in what it tells us. To suggest, as Belsey does, that true new science, as opposed to bad old empiricist science, has eliminated the possibility of limits, units, wholes of any sort, is
simply wrong. Here her source is specifically Lacan, to whom Althusser also frequently tips his hat:
Linguistic change) therefore) any alteratWn of the relatWnship between man and the signifier, ((changes
the whole course of history by nwdif;ing the moorings that anchor his being.)~ .. And this discovery of
a world without fixity, a cosmos permitting infinite movement) constitutes the Copernican rrnJlutWn
which Lacan attributes to Freud. . . .
The scientific rrnJlutWn of the Renaissance was not) of course) the work of a single individual. In
the same way, as Lacan suggests) the modern Copernican rrnJlutWn is taking place in a number ofareas
simultaneously. Althusser, drawing attcntWn to the implicatWns ofLacan's reading ofFreud) points also
to the parallels with Marxism.12
The alleged parallel between the Copernican revolution and the "revolution" illuminated by Lacan's version of Freud and Althusser's version of Marx (which Belsey extends into the physical world) is entirely
bogus. The whole point of the Copernican revolution is that a new theory explained previously inexplicable empirically observed phenomena, and that once the theory was proposed, it eventually gained virtually total acquiescence. Belsey's implication, that belief in a cosmos containing elements of fixity (like the
"self') and operating by physical laws now has the same intellectual status as the Ptolemaic image of the
solar system, is insupportable.
Although scientists do now accept the recent discovery by physicists that matter is constituted of particles unimaginably small and in constant motion, they have not therefore cancelled the sciences of biology, astronomy, and geology, which deal with matter in larger units and treat it as solid; Belsey's wish to
cancel all large and fixed units in literature, particularly characters, on the basis of a fanciful linguistic and
psychological theory has no parallel in science whatsoever. More than one thing is true at once in science:
electrons, atoms, molecules, tissues, bodies, families, continents, planets, solar systems all exist. No total
change from an old bad empirical science of fixed objects to a new good theoretical science of infinite movement has taken place. In science, theory and empiricism are partners, not ideological enemies; whatever
Belsey, Lacan, and Althusser are doing, it is certainly not the science that they claim it is.

S

TILL, WE MIGHT GRANT the possible value of a flawed system of thought that is intellec-

tually coherent and yields unusual insights. Belsey's system, however, is a pastiche of exactly what
she claims to be discovering in the literary texts which are now, for the first time in history, being examined
correctly: contradictions. The first, most striking one is the simultaneoqs attack on the "authoritarianism"
of all literary texts except those few "writerlyJ) texts that the avant-garde- Brecht, Barthes- have pronounced
"interrogative" and enlightened, and the unquestioning obeisance to another set of authorities-Lacan,
Saussure, Althusser, Barthes, Derrida. Belsey gives a partial pat on the back to reader-response criticism
as "a rejection of authorial tyranny"; 13 virtually every page of Critical Practice contains a scathing phrase
of this nature. Why, then, are the French demigods not subject to her critical "interrogation"? The tone
in which the deconstructionist authorities are referred to is extraordinary; no other academic, discussing
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earlier authorities such as Frye and Booth (despised, of course, by the deconstructionists), has ever deferred to them more slavishly.
Post-Saussurean work on language has challenged the whole concept ofrealism; Roland Barthes has specifically
proclaimed the death of the author; and Jacques Lacan, Louis Althusser, and Jacques Derrida have all from
various positrons questWned the humanist assumptron that subjectivity, the individual mind or inner being,
is the source of meaning and of actWn. In this context the notWn of a text which tells a (or the) truth, as
perceived by an individual subject (the author), whose insights are the source ofthe text's single and authoritative meaning, is not only untenable but literally unthinkable, because the framework which supported it, a
framework of assumptrons and discourses, ways of thinking and talking, no longer stands.14
To proclaim is not to prove; to question is not to disprove. Why are these "authors" and their proclamations sacrosanct among deconstructionist literary critics? Mr. Althusser in particular, who recently died in
a hospital for the insane where he had been incarcerated for murdering his wife, might be worth a second
thought or two. It is not impossible that these authorities might actually stand up to the most rigorous
examination; my point is only that deconstructionist literary critics have not examined them, but have
treated them as mouthpieces of the Divine Word and quoted them without external corroboration -allegedly
for the sake of undermining the idea of authority.
A second large-scale contradiction lies in the conflict between what deconstructionists say it is desirable
to "produce'' from the language of literary texts and the language in which they write their own criticism.
Bad is unitary, simple, clear, logical, centered; good is multiple, indeterminate, unexpected. The object
of criticism is to "liberate'' texts:
The object of deconstructing the text is to examine the process of its production-not the private experience
of the individual author, but the mode ofproductron, the materials and their arrfl,ngement in the work. The
aim is to locate the point of contmdictron within the text, the point at which it tmnsgresses the limits within
which it is constructed, breaks flu of the constmints imposed by its own realist form. Composed of contmdictWns, the text is no longer restricted to a single, harmonious and authoritative reading. Instead it becomes plum!, open to re-reading, no longer an object for passive consumptron but an object ofwork by the reader to produce
meaning.15
Why, then, is the whole school of criticism, of which Belsey's book is merely one representative, composed
of clones? Here are a few samples that have crossed my desk- memos from colleagues, dissertation abstracts,
critical books by famous people.
In the Saussurean perspective meaning is the product ofa linguistic system, the effict ofa system ofdiffirences.
To account for meaning is to set forth the relatWn ofcontmst and the possibilities ofcombinatWn that constitute
a language.
Ingeneral usage, poststructumlism implies at least four things. First, it implies a recqgnitron that social realityits divisions, structures, objects and subjects-is discursively constituted.
This course will address the following questions: what is an author, what is ideologx what is culture. It will
then 1noVe on to such issues as the role(s) literature plays in a culture; how literature produces, furthers, and
interrogates dominant and authorized ideologies, and the relatronship between ideokJgy and aesthetic form.
It is a novel that threatens to crack open the powerful ideokJgy of realism as a literary mode, and throws into
question the whole enterprise of narrfl,tive.
The course is a posttnodern tmnsdisciplinary inquiry into narrfl,tWn as a mode of intelligibility. It irwestigates
the way in which narrfl,tiPes of various kinds (film, historical accounts, novels, tm.ffic signs, balkts, conversatWns . . .) form our cqgnitive environment and provide us with patterns ofperceptron, organizatWn, and interpretatWn of our experience in culture. The focus of the course is on the place of narrfl,tWn in the signifYing
practices that generate the ideological productron and circulatWn of the «rea[" in culture and on narrfl,til'ity
as the enabling conditron of knowing (and thus its inscriptron in the politics of cqgnitron and constructWn of
«knowledge'') in such human discourses as psychoanalysis, film, science, «fiterature," philosophy, and literary thcury.
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Peas in a pod, birds of a feather. Where's the great liberated multiplicity here? Same stilted sentence stru<;-ture, same code words, same authorities. If you put the despised "realists"-Dickens, Austen, Eliot-next
to each other, they don't sound the same. If you put the pre-poststructuralist critics-Booth, Frye, Williams, Moers-next to each other, they don't sound the same.
Deconstructionist theory, which claims to be on a quest for differences, which asserts its ability to liberate texts, has eliminated differences and become a critical machine. It could be argued that the unanimity
among deconstructionists follows naturally from the decentering and dissolution of the false ideological
construct, "the self." But according to their theory, the deconstruction of the self is supposed to be another form of liberation; it is supposed to release multiplicity, not produce robots.
All of these objections would fall by the wayside if deconstructive readings yielded interesting new ideas
about literary texts-even partial and flawed new ideas. All literary practices are partial and flawed. Since
I admit to having read only a sample of this criticism, I must concede the possibility thar somewhere someone may be doing something dazzling with it, unbeknownst to me; but to return to Catherine Betseymighty Cathy has struck out. She hands her critics the best possible weapon in choosing for deconstructive
analysis two genuinely radical texts (an'l.ong others): The Wintn"'s 1ide 16 and "The Scholar Gypsy"; 17 in reading
them, she denies all radical intention to their authors and ignores their most interesting passages. Instead,
she concentrates on "lacunae'' in the texts, moments of self-contradiction, passages where the texts apparently turn on their own processes. Never, never, does she concede the possibility that Shakespeare and
Arnold might have had some very explosive things to say about the political worlds they inhabited.

IB

ELSEY DOES GRANT The Wintn"'s Iale privileged status as an "interrogative'' text because of
what she considers the inexplicability ofLeontes' mad jealousy in the first half and the many reminders
in the second that ballads, plays, and stories are fictions. "In this way it challenges the realist concept of
art, and invites the spectators to reflect on fiction as a discursive practice and the ways in which discourse
allows them to grasp their relation to the real relations in which they live.ma
On the first point, Betsey is simply wrong, a careless and disrespectful reader who is blind to Shakespeare's
care and subtlety. It is true that we cannot ever know all the reasons that Leontes becomes possessed with
the idea that his wife and his best friend are lovers-but Shakespeare tells us so much! The extraordinary
intimacy developed during Polixenes' long visit would almost inevitably lead to sexual desire, even if that
desire was repressed in the interest of fidelity. Also, the verbal joking of Hermione and Polixenes activates
sexual fantasy in Leontes' mind, fantasy that quickly gets out of control. Polixenes lovingly remembers
his sinless, sexless boyhood friendship with Leontes, and declares they were free from original sin at that
time. Hermione answers, "By this we gather I You have tripped since'' (1. 2. 75-76); they play back and
forth with the idea that married sex is sin, and that both kings are now married. But all Leontes hears
is his wife's,
The offinses we have made you do we'll answer
If you first sinned with us) and that with us
You did continue foult) and that you slipped not
With any but with us.

(1. 2. 83-86)
The ambiguity of that "us" begins Leontes' madness. And the final bit of information that Shakespeare
gives us in the scene is that Leontes still remembers how long it took him to win Hermione, and still suffers
from the memory:
Three cmhbed tnonths had soured themselves to death
Ere I could make thee open thy white hand
And clap thyself my luve.

(1.

2. 100-102)

This ancient pain has made him insecure, vulnerable to jealous madness.
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One part of the true radicalism of The Winter's Tale lies in the way Shakespeare retains our sympathy
for Leontes even while showing him drawn into mad, murderous jealousy; our continuing sympathy finally
lets us imagine a world where mental sickness is understandable, curable, and forgivable. It is a world as
radiantly and radically free from evil as that of the American transcendentalists, a true break with Renaissance conceptions of man's sinful nature. Where else in Renaissance literature do we see two kings- powerful,
bossy, privileged men- becoming murderous toward members of their families (for in the second half of
the play Polixenes becomes as mad as Leontes) and being corrected by women, children, shepherds, even
a thief. The two kings are liberated from the enclosed and destructive worlds of male power in their courts
and forced into a more loving and egalitarian world. Who needs lacunae, textual interrogations, when they
have lines like these?
This child was prisoner to the womb, and is
By law and process ofgreat nature thence
Freed and enfranchised.
(2 . 2. 59-61)
I was about to speak and tell him plainly
The selfsame sun that shines upon his Court
Hides not his visage from our cottage but
Looks on alike.
(4. 4· 453-56)

Now he thanks the old shepherd, which stands by like a weather-bitten conduit of many kings' reigns.
(5.

2.

59-6o)

Which is more liberating, to contemplate the "fictivity'' of fiction, or to imagine that nature bestows
freedom and political rights and to remember that a king does not have much of a kingdom without the
shepherds and old stone conduits that keep the agricultural world going? The proverbial Great Chain of
Being is dissolved in The Winter's Tale; as much as any Leveller or Digger, Shakespeare has turned the hierarchical Renaissance world upside down. Lacunae indeed.
Arnold's "Scholar Gypsy'' is not in the same class as The Winter's Tale, but here too the purported "liberation" of Ms. Belsey's deconstructive reading goes astray. She does not classify this poem as an interrogative
text, but demotes it to the category of a text needing deconstruction. Still, she does grant it a smattering
of interrogative validity: "The dissatisfaction of the text with the logic of its own argument in this central
section is everywhere apparent."19 It is true that the poem hedges on the reality of poetic vision; so does
most nineteenth-century poetry. But when Ms. Belsey says, "Finally the image of the Tyrian trader produces
an illusion of closure, an ad hoc optimism only tenuously related to the total organization of the poem;'20
I can think only that she does not know what a Tyrian trader is, or what Arnold's last stanzas mean. After
beckoning the dubiously real Scholar Gypsy in the first half of the poem, Arnold's speaker sends
him away in the second, to keep him safe from the ills of modern life. That is easy enough. The unusual
parts of the poem are the two disturbing, even revolutionary, comparisons with which the speaker warns
the Gypsy.
Still fly, plunge deeper in the bowering wood!
Averse, as Dido did with gesture stern
From her false friend's approach in Hades turn,
Wave us away, and keep thy solitude.
(207-10)

Then fly our greetings, fly our speech and smiles!
-As some gmve Ijrian tmder, from the sea,
Descried at sunrise an emerging prow
Lifting the coolrhaired creepers stealthily,
And knew the intrnder on his ancient home,
The young ligh~hearted masters of the wave;And snatch'd his rudder, and shoot out more sail!
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Arnold's images here are as politically shocking for the nineteenth century as Shakespeare's images of nature and society in The Winter's Tale are for the seventeenth. He has associated the sickness of modem
life with Greece and Rome, not as fountainheads of civilization and progress, but as cruel and conquering
empires. He has associated the elusive Scholar Gypsy with the conquered peoples: the Carthaginians on
whose soil the Romans sowed salt, and the Tyrians who were replaced by the imperialistic Athenians. Most
mid-nineteenth-century Englishmen wanted to be imperialists and despised people weak enough to be
conquered; Arnold is going after the heart of British foreign policy in this quiet, lyrical poem.
To understand this, a reader needs some faint knowledge of traditional history, not the mystical "true
history" that critics like Belsey claim to be finding in the lacunae of texts. The ultimate purpose of deconstructive reading is to deny writers the power to say dangerous things to their readers, and to appropriate
for the critic all claims to radical politics. The critic, not the reader; no ordinary human being could possibly expect to know what was going on in a play by Shakespeare or a poem by Arnold without initiation
into the higher mysteries of deconstruction.

A

~Why has this strange project, deconstructive reading, engaged so many ambitious young English
ND HERE WE CAN BEGIN a second "mode of inquiry;' to borrow a fashionable phrase:

and American professors? Perhaps the first question is, Why haven't more people objected to it on intellectual grounds? Why don't more professors of literature recognize that what deconstructionists say about
science and empiricism is wrong? I can only suggest a variation on a common moan: our educational system stinks. The practitioners of deconstruction are obviously not in the same category as the functionally
illiterate victims of inner-city schools; they are the products of reasonably good colleges and excellent graduate
schools. So why do they nod in acquiescence when Althusser, or Belsey, says something perfectly loony
about science? The excellent graduate schools, to begin with, are so limited in their definition of professionalism and expertise that they do not require any general knowledge from their students. And so students who have managed to get to graduate school without knowing anything about scientific thought
will get through, as well. As for the preliminary stages of education, they are still suffering from the mistaken policies of the would-be reformers of the sixties: eliminate requirements, encourage growth and development. And the three disciplines that suffered most from these policies were those requiring patience,
discipline, and memory-foreign languages, history, and science. The products of the best graduate schools
still share a common culture with the average American voter, who can elect a president who says trees
cause pollution. In the sixties science unfortunately became linked with the technologies of war, and lost
standing as a part of everyday thought . This widespread contempt for science has allowed similar mental
processes to link serious young professors who quote Lacan as proof of a new cosmos of limitless motion
with the dizzy young flower children who claimed that transcendental meditation would allow them to
fly and the bureaucrats of the Pentagon who pay no heed to the warnings of scientists that computerized
lasers in space will not protect us from hydrogen bombs.
Educational failings and ignorance of science do not, however, explain why so many intelligent people
actually like deconstruction . Deconstruction creates passionate, avid converts, not curious dabblers. One
reason for its appeal is that it offers the practitioner the illusion of political action -all conducted within
the safety of the library and the classroom! Deconstructionists often claim to be Marxists- big, bad, scary
Marxists; but the person they quote is not Marx-it is Althusser. And the most pertinent passage in Althusser,
though not the one they quote most, is his hypocritical apology to the workers of the world in Reading
Capital:
Even when this dichotomy [between theory and pmctice} is the servant of a revolutionary vision which exalts
the workerr' cause, their labour, their su.fforings, their struggles and their experience in the undijfrrentiated
proclamation of the primacy ofpmctice, it still remains ideological: just as egalitarian communism is still an
ideological conception of the aim of the workerr' movement. In the strict sense, an egalitarian conception of
pmctice-and I say this with the deep respect every Marxist owes to the experience and sacrifices of the men
whose labour, su.fforings and struggles still nourish and sustain our whole present and foturr:, all our arguments
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for lift and hope-an egtditariRn conceptWn ofpmctice is ro dialectical materialism what egalitarian communism is ro scientific communism: a conceptron ro be criticized and superceded in urder ro establish a scientific
conceptron of pmctice exactly in its place.21
Forget action; what is important now is a scientific conception of practice. So long, workers, it's been good
to know you.
Here we can begin to examine deconstruction as a present-day political phenomenon. In transferring
politics from the world to the text, and political thought from literature to criticism, deconstruction is
the latest, ugliest phase of the academic radicalism that began in the sixties. "Don't trust anyone over thirty"
has now become the assault on the "authorities" of literary texts; The Greeni'!!J ofAmerica and the Maki'!!J
ofa Counter Culturr: have, like Spielberg's Gremlins, gone through their cocoon stage and reemerged as books
like Critical Practice. They are hard and tough now, no longer soft and sweet-but at the core is the same
old dawning of the Age of Aquarius. Except now it's called the end of ideology.
The saddest and most unfortunate connection is that the current textual revolutionaries have followed
in the footsteps of their bead-wearing predecessors by staying safely on campus. Even though the best of
the radicals of the sixties had genuine political goals-civil rights for black Americans, an end to imperialist
war crimes in Vietnam-campus radicals as a group never managed to connect themselves with working
citizens. And graduation usually meant goodbye to all that. The radicals of the sixties tried and fuiled to
be activists; following the kindly lead of Mr. Althusser the critics of the eighties do not even pretend to
be interested in working people, but proclaim proudly that the deconstructive thought is all that counts.
This brazen, self-righteous coldness in the new utopians is more striking than any quality linking them
to their forebears-or even their youthful selves-of the sixties. Whatever their fuults, many of the radicals
of the sixties had qualities of hope, generosity, kindness, and expansiveness very different from the brittleness, rigidity, and conformity of the deconstructionists of the eighties. One big change in both the economic and academic worlds over the last twenty years that seems deeply connected to the language and
method of the new criticism is the ubiquitous presence of the computer. Anyone not using at least a word
processor at the university is called retrograde; walk into any commercial office and you hear the soothing
click of keys that do not sound like the keys of typewriters; turn on your television and get the message
that any child deprived of a computer after the age of two is virtually doomed to a life on skid row. The
microchip is said to have revolutionized thought. But it hasn't. Computers can perform only those processes
that a thinking person has programmed into them; they cannot originate anything, intuit anything, feel
anything.
It might be possible to program a computer to look for gaps in texts as deconstructionists do; it is not
possible for a computer to feel whatever Emily Dickinson felt when she said real poetry made her feel like
the top of her head was coming off. What deconstructionists have attempted to exclude from literary criticism, emotional and physical response, is what a computer would necessarily exclude. And one of the key
words of deconstructionist lingo is also a key word among computer operators: inl:errq!Jate. That is the way
computers, unlike normal human beings, ask questions.
This word also has a more ominous usage, a usage which is also revealing with respect to deconstructionist thought. Torturers and agents of police states also interrogate. Though the word could be used in
common conversation as a synonym for ask> it is not. You interrogate not your friends, but your computer
and your presumed enemy. And a further meaning is usually contained in the word; torturers interrogate
not to find out what they do not know, but to extract an admission of what they presume they do know.
Even interrogating a suspect to get a list of other enemies presumes that those enemies exist. And this,
in fuct, is just what deconstructionist critics like Belsey do. They presume that they already know what
a text must reveal-complicity in the capitalist crimes ofWestern civilization-and apply the thumbscrews
and the cattle prods until a text can be made to confess, by revealing its lacunae, gaps, and moments of
self-contradiction.
This leads back to the cold and mechanical writing style, the prevalence of the word puwer in deconstructionist writing itself. Though officially most deconstructionists label themselves leftists, their language
reveals an affinity with the kind of police state that can be officially either right or left-authoritarian or
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totalitarian, in Jeane Kirkpatrick's deceptive terminology. The question is, why don't literary critics shudder when they use words that bring to mind both Pol Pot and Pinochet? What hidden psychological need
generates a vocabulary of words like puwer and interrogation?
Other dominant words in the new criticism reveal other strange affinities, other ties to the culture that
is purportedly being repudiated. Innovation, for example, is a close cousin of interrogation. An interrogative
text is also an innovative text. Pound did not say "make it innovative'' in his injunction to poets; he said
"make it new." Innovative and new are synonyms, but they are not, in fuct, used in the same way. A baby
is new-but never innovative. An innovation is a gimmick, something added to a product so that it will
be saleable to the ever-eager, addicted consumers of capitalist culture. Glossy catalogues are full of"innovations" in tools, collar shapes, skirt lengths, automotive accessories. There is one whole catalogue called
simply Innovations, devised on the assumption that its products will be automatically desirable, no matter
what they are. Innovation is an odd word of praise in the mouths of people who claim to be calling into
question the very foundations of our culture, putting into "erasure'' what we mistakenly consider eternal
and self-evident truths. The desirability of"innovations" derives from the Western fuith in progress on the
basis of which so much money has been produced for capitalism . This belief in progress truly deserves
questioning. It is not, after all, shared by the Native Americans whose lands we are occupying, or by the
Balinese or the Eskimos or most of the other Third World cultures in whose interests one contingent of
deconstructionists claims to be about to topple Western civilization. If anyone is truly interested in toppling an oppressive, exploitative, imperialistic economic system, a good place to start is with the Big Lie
we have used to convince the rest of the world that they need our products for a Better Life. As long
as deconstruction praises innovation, it had better go easy in its claims of revolutionary political power.

A

~ after all, the former is a product of capitalist culture. A stranger connection is suggested by the
FFINITIES BETWEEN deconstruction and consumer capitalism are not exactly surprising;

vituperative loathing with which the word humanism is uttered by deconstructionists. Secular humanism
is also the Black Beast, the Scarlet Whore to Jerry Falwell and the religious fur right, that brand of Christians who oppose abortion and fuvor school prayer, who oppose labor unions and fuvor the ruling party
in South Africa. Like utilitarianism and logical positivism, humanism sounds like a sad cry from the distant
and unsophisticated past. It can certainly be questioned; those of us who believe whales have as much
right to live as people do are not exactly humanists. Yet in the mouths of Belsey, Althusser, Derrida, Falwell, the attack on humanism does not imply a less species-centered concern for the earth and all its creatures. Falwell considers humanism the enemy of God; Belsey and company consider it the enemy of the
New 'lluth. The deep link here between the radical right and the deconstructionists lies in an unquestioning absoluteness of fuith, and in a mentality that demands a holy war on other members of our species.
The mere claim that other people, no matter what their color or their ideology, are "human too'' is no
cause for restraint to soldiers in a holy war. The battle between holy warriors of all persuasions and their
poor, tired, democratic, humanist opponents is an old one; an early battle cry was "Carthago delenda est."
Humanists have always looked weak, messy, doddering to their fired-up opponents. The humanists of the
Weimar Republic look pretty good now, however. History has not been kind to holy warriors and their
violence in the cause of purity.
The combination of coldness and violence can be found in other regions currently occupied by Young
Urban Professionals; it is not restricted to police states and English departments. The new drug of choice,
for example, is cocaine, which has a mystique very different from that of the drugs of the sixties. Marijuana
and LSD were supposed to make you open, sensitive, relaxed, artistic, creative, tuned into music and nature. Coke is supposed to make you speedy, sexy, dynamic, and powerful. One major league ballplayer
said recently, "It gives them the feeling they can do anything. 'I can conquer the world; like Superman.»>2
The world is to be conquered, not enjoyed or understood; for deconstructionists, literary texts too have
become enemy territory to be conquered.
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The same self-directed acquisition of power for its own sake characterizes the entirely legal Yuppie enterprise of body building. A recent issue (September 1985) of The Sharper Image catalogue announces on
its cover, "Fitness comes home. With a new generation of advanced equipment for body conditioning without
compromise." It contains advertisements for radios, toy weapons, fancy coffee makers (for a legal speed
trip), and, above all, body-building equipment. Indoor bicycling, indoor rowing, home Nautilus machines.
Not hiking equipment, not canoes, not baseball mitts; the whole point is to get strong without any engagement with either the natural world or other people. Strength is good; labor is bad. For those Yuppies
who can no longer stand the backbreaking strain of dialing the telephone, we have "Diales I, the astonishing phone with the power to distinguish spoken words and match them with pre-programmed numbers."
Once again, the obsession with power and disdain for the material world parallels what goes on in deconstructionist criticism.
This odd assortment of phenomena-cocaine use, body building, and deconstruction-are all part of
the cultural narcissism that Christopher Lasch has described; they all include its sickest symptoms. ''At
the same time they [narcissists] entertain fantasies of omnipotence and a strong belief in their right to exploit others and be gratified.m3 What the sparkling clean Sharper Image catalogue conceals, but the prose
of Althusser, loaded with images of guilt and murder, reveals, is the rest of the structure of the pathologically narcissistic personality: "Archaic, punitive, and sadistic elements predominate in the superegos of these
patients, and they conform to social rules more out of fear of punishment than from a sense of guilt. They
experience their own needs and appetites, suffused with rage, as deeply dangerous, and they throw up defenses
that are as primitive as the desires they seek to stifle." 24 Both conformity and a wild appetite for power
characterize all aspects of the life of Young Urban Professionals. Deconstructionists also display the narcissist's profound Oedipal rage, directed against the bad parents of the past, the literary authorities of the
past who have so rudely exerted their power by being called great.
The coldness and sterility of our present narcissism, as displayed in deconstructionist criticism, may be
a genuine sign of the economic crisis of the present, which is very different from the economic crises of
the past. Young Urban Professionals wear the whitest of all white collars; they are not the managers of
factories where someone else is spewing out soot, but the managers of offices where the computer is the
instrument of production, and markings on various forms of paper are the main "product." (A few bona
fide Yuppies do make things like ten-dollars-a-pint ice cream and Nautilus machines, but most produce
paper and services.) Production is another key deconstructionist word; it is what Althusser and Belsey most
vehemently declare they are providing to the enlightened reader. "Liberated from the fixity of the communication model, the text is available for production in the process of reading;' says Belsey? 5
This is production? One of the most overwhelming and terrifYing economic facts of the advanced capitalist societies of the West is that production of material goods is shifting to the Third World as fast as
the owners of multinational companies can move their factories. Steel and shoes are from Brazil; clothes
are from Hong Kong and El Salvador. Unlike the Japanese, who are producing most of their goods at home,
with their own workers, the Americans, English, and French are moving production elsewhere, to places
without labor unions, and with lots of women and children to exploit, leaving abandoned factories, ravaged
cities, and broken workers behind them. We are told about "service industries" and "high tech" as the bridges
over the economic abyss; sure. What computers can't do is make food, clothing, and shelters, the necessities for life in the material world. The "capitalist mode of production" of which Althusser and his followers
speak in such sweeping terms is not a static entity; deconstruction belongs to the capitalism of the last
few years, not to that of nineteenth-century England.
Production and puwer: what do these words really mean to the Young Urban Professionals of whom deconstructionists are merely an esoteric clan? Yuppies can certainly produce money and comforts for themselves,
and exert power over secretaries and others unfortunate enough to be below them in the corporate hierarchy. But it seems to me that the deconstructionist obsession with "production" of texts, and the general
Yuppie obsession with power have an inverse relationship to genuine economic power to produce goods.
English professors are not very far above the five-year-olds with whom I began in actual economic power;
powerlessness creates the need to play Masters of the Universe.
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Does it matter? Is anyone being hurt by deconstructionism? Deconstructionism is not as important as
the destruction of furms, or the transference of industry to the Third World, or the dominance of the industrial war machine. But it does matter. As Mr. Althusser so rightly insists, literature is a culturally active
force. And so when a generation of educators chooses to teach a generation of students the "methodology"
of deconstruction, the potential results of such indoctrination should be contemplated seriously. As an
outmoded and retrograde empiricist, I know how to think about the future in only one way, by thinking
about the past. In spite of the bizarre language of deconstruction, and in spite of its connections with
a genuinely new form of capitalism, it is also a new outlet for some old impulses, impulses which other
people have traced to their inexorable ends.
Though it might surprise those critics who flatter themselves that for the first time in human history
a few enlightened minds-their own-are breaking out of the bondage of ideology, irr fuct a surprisirrg number
of deconstructionist ideas, about the oppressiveness of authority, the nonexistence of a stable self, the illusory nature of morality, can be found in earlier literature. I will mention, briefly, two very disparate examples: The Picture of Dorian Gmy 26 and King Lear. 27 How fur are the aphorisms of Lord Henry Wotton
from the declarations of the deconstructionists?
Names are everything. I never quam;/ with actions. My one quam;/ is with words. That is the reason I hate
vul!Jar realism in literature. The man who could call a spade a spade should be compelled to use one.
(Ch. 17)

As for the aged, I always contradict the aged. I do it on principle.
(Ch.

19)

Conscience and cowardice are really the same things, Basil. Conscience is the trade name ofthe finn. That is all.
(Ch. I)
This novel anticipates most of what Lasch says in The Culture of Narr:issism; it is a portrait, both seductive
and frightening, of a society of discontinuity, where the idle rich scorn both parents and children in their
quest for infinite variety and freedom in their experiences of pleasure. The book rings truer to me every
year: the quest for power and pleasure has a price-violence. The narcissistic hero is fascinated with sadistic
characters, such as --Gian Maria Visconti, who used hounds to chase living men, and whose murdered
body was covered with roses by a harlot who had loved him" (Ch. n); from this he proceeds to murder
and suicide. Sterile pleasures generate violence. Violence is just below the surfuce in the perpetual attacks
launched by deconstructionist criticism; the liberation it proclaims is anything but joyful.
Wilde's Lord Henry Wotton is hardly the first literary spokesman for narcissism as an enlightened philosophy; we can go back to the seventeenth century and find such philosophies irr the mouths of Shakespeare's
villains: Iago, Edmund, Goneril, Regan.
Deconstructionists are not the first to despise "closure" as one of the fulsities of fiction; in King Lear,
Shakespeare's Edmund is despising it when he says of his brother, "And pat he comes like the catastrophe
of the old comedy" (r. 2. 14-5). Edgar, against whom Edmund is plotting, has just entered the room; Edmund laughs at the idea that Edgar could ever really come to seek retribution . He assumes that the endings of old comedies are literary devices that mislead gullible audiences into believing that acts will have
consequences. He finds willing converts in Goneril and Regan, who are also happy to believe that they
can pursue power in absolute freedom.
The whole play is Shakespeare's answer to such philosophies, his insistence that even without avenging
gods or a sympathetic natural world, retribution is built into our human nature. Power and pleasure again
beget violence-poisonings, stabbings, blindings. Albany is right when he warns his wife,
If that the Heavens do not their visible spirits
Send quickly down to tame these vile offinses
It will come.
Humanity must perforre prey on itself
Like monsters of the deep.
(+-
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We still belong to the animal kingdom, whether we like it or not; the laws of the material, biological world
apply, no matter what illusory freedoms the power-hungry human mind concocts.
Both Shakespeare and Wilde might be rejected by an Althusserian, of course. It could be said that their
works are ideological devices, pieces of propaganda aimed at making a potentially rebellious class shut up
and be good. Maybe. But how can Althusser's theories account for parallel phenomena among noncapitalist,
non-Western peoples who are the subjects of anthropological observation? The Ik of Colon Turnbull's The
Mountain People are devoted to power, will, appetite; they are free from the idea of the coherent self; they
have truly escaped from what Althusser and his followers call the circle of ideology. Displaced hunter-gatherers,
forcibly removed from their tribal lands, relocated in a place where they do not know how to support
themselves, they turn into monsters, just like Goneril and Regan. Free, without beliefs or bonds, they
snatch food from the young and laugh at the suffering of the old. When Turnbull gave an old man some
food, he was quickly robbed and beaten:
Once Lolim, trying to cover his poor head with his bony anns, accidmtally caught Amwa in the mouth. Instantly Amwa, with the back of his right hand, slapped Lolim as hard as he could on the side of his face,
knocking the old man to the ground. There were shrieks of delighted laughter, but as the old man lay still,
not 11UJIJing and not even crying, the .fon WQ1'l: thin, and when I approached, anthropological detachment having long since departed, they lost interest and went away.28
And the Ik are hardly alone. In a review of A Poison Stronger than Luve: The DestructWn of an Ojibwa
Community, by Anastasia M. Shkilnyk, Norman A. Chance discusses the same horror. A tribe loses its ancestral lands and kinship system-and this tribe is also subjected to mercury poisoning-and turns into a
group of alien beings: alcoholic, suicidal, murderous, sexually abusive toward children.
For the people of Grassy Narrows, as for many native North Americans, land is not just part of nature; it
is also eruWwed with spirit that tmnscends nature. Innd is, in essence, a gift to be held ccin trust" for .foture
genemtWns. If that trust is broken, if the land is damaged, assistance is unlikely to be forthcoming. After all,
poisoned land, like poisoned people, becomes angry?9
The Ik and the Ojibwa corroborate Shakespeare and Wilde, reminding us that though we do not understand why we need our biological bonds, our rules, our places, we do need them . Once again, we are
part of a material world. Being material, we cannot know precisely how we belong to the rest of the world
but we can know that if we try to choose a world of detachment and denial, we will pay with our humanity.
Everything in deconstruction and the Yuppie world of which it is a part points the other way. Bonds
are ideology; ideology is imprisonment; materiality has no independent order or meaning without our
mental acts; our rightful good is mental freedom, total control over our environment, self-created strength.
No one can get deconstructionists to examine the counterevidence, since they make a point of disdaining
empirical evidence and scientific method, but it is mounting up, evidence that our brave new world of
software, high tech, facilitators, innovators, interrogators, and other products of alienated labor is not in
good shape. This evidence all finally leads back to the idea of science; Shakespeare and the Ojibwa both
demand that we acknowledge our biological place in a natural world that we did not make and can only
begin to understand with care, patience, and humility.
Technology is arrogant. Science is humble. Deconstruction claims to be "true science;' but it is technological gimmickry, another delusive weapon in the Yuppie arsenal of control, domination, and denial of
the fact that we live in a world we never made, a world that does not play by the mind's rules. Though
the spiritual connections in which the Ojibwa used to believe could not be called scientific, the deep humility of the belief that human life cannot be separate from other life is closer to science than deconstruction is. Science is more closely connected with mystery, reverence, and a faith that we are bound by moral
laws we did not choose, than with a maniacal quest for pleasure and power in the absence of all law.
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